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Abstract
We design an experiment to study individual behavior in a strategic information setting where the sender has economic
incentives to deceive and the receiver has economic incentives to avoid deception. To ascertain whether subjects
in the role of receiver glean information content from the sender’s message, we elicit choices from risky gambles
constructed to be mathematically equivalent to the information setting if the sender’s message lacks information
content. In the experiment subjects act simultaneously as a sender and receiver in a one-shot interaction. The findings
of our experiment indicate that (i) subjects tend to act deceptively as senders but trusting as receivers, and (ii) as
receivers, subjects glean information content from the senders’ messages. Thus, we find investors (receivers) trust and
investment cannot be rationalized solely by subjects’ attitudes towards risk.
Key words: experiment, level-k thinking, strategic communication, risk preference, beliefs
1. Introduction
“Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first
we practice to believe.” – Laurence J. Peter,
misquoting Sir Walter Scott
In standard equilibria, predictions are constructed as-
suming that individuals entertain beliefs of others’
strategies by analyzing what others might do and adopt-
ing rational strategies in response. In an information
transmission setting with a conflict of interest between
the sender and receiver, the sender’s desire to misrepre-
sent his or her information is anticipated in equilibrium
by the receiver. Accordingly, the sender does not con-
vey all information, but the receiver cannot be described
as misled, as the receiver has unraveled the sender’s in-
tensions to misrepresent information.
Email addresses: sheremet@chapman.edu (Roman
Sheremeta), shields@chapman.edu (Timothy Shields)
1We would like to thank Glenn Pfeiffer and Jack Stecher for their
suggestions, our colleagues at the Argyros School of Business and
Economics for their helpful comments, and Chapman University for
its support.
As the equilibrium theory of Crawford and Sobel (1982)
predicts, when the preferences of the sender and re-
ceiver diverge, not all information is transmitted. How-
ever, while experimental senders do adopt deceptive
transmission strategies, the senders transmit more in-
formation concerning the true state of nature than equi-
libria predict. Likewise, receivers rely more on the
senders’ messages than would be expected based on the-
oretical predictions (Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2009;
Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2008).
Research in the area of financial markets has provided
empirical evidence that financial analysts exaggerate
recommendations. Michaely and Womack (1999) at-
tribute this documented bias to conflicts of interest be-
tween the analysts and investors, citing both brokerage
commissions and the investment banking business as
possible sources. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)
and Franco et al (2007) find evidence of differences in
the reaction of investors, suggesting that some investors
are misled by deceptive recommendations despite the
disclosure of conflicts of interests.
In summary, both empirical and experimental evidence
suggests that while senders tend to adopt deceptive prac-
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tices, receivers act on information sent as if they, in
some sense, trust senders’ messages. It is important,
however, that any interpretation of behavior is a joint as-
sumption upon the subjects’ risk neutral preferences and
beliefs of others strategies. In this work, we design an
experiment to determine if receivers attempt to glean in-
formation content from senders’ messages or are simply
abiding by risk preferences. In the experiment subjects
act simultaneously as a sender and receiver in a one-
shot interaction of an information transmission game.
We elicit choices from risky gambles constructed to be
mathematically equivalent to the information setting if
the sender’s message lacks information content. The
two main findings are that (i) subjects tend to act de-
ceptively as senders but trusting as receivers, and (ii) as
receivers, subjects glean information content from the
senders messages.
2. Theoretical Model and Experimental Design
2.1. The Model
The experimental design is based on a sender-receiver
information transmission game. The game proceeds as
follows. In the first stage, the sender receives a pri-
vate perfect signal θ ∈ {A,B} about the true state of na-
ture. It is public knowledge that the state of the nature
is equally likely to be favorable (i.e., A) or unfavorable
(i.e., B).
In the second stage, the sender releases a public message
θˆ ∈ {A,B} regarding the state, after receiving a private
signal θ . After receiving the message θˆ the receiver can
invest his cash endowment η , in which case he receives
pi(θ) ∈ {piA,piB}. The investment pays piB < η when θ
is B, and piA > η when θ is A. If the receiver decides
not to invest he retains his endowment. The sender earns
compensation λ > 0 if the receiver decides to invest, or
else receives nothing.
In the last stage, the true state of nature is revealed and
both players receive their payoffs based on the state and
depending on the investment decision of the receiver.
Utility functions are represented by U(.) where U ′(.)>
0. As per rational exceptions prediction, a ‘babbling
equilibrium’ should occur where the sender’s report
contains no information content. As such, the receiver
anticipating deception will be skeptical of the message
and invest only if inequality (1) is true:
U(piA)
2
+
U(piB)
2
≥U(η) (1)
2.2. Conditions and Parameters
Holding piB and η fixed, we manipulate piA over four
conditions such that equation (1) is true in half of the
conditions if the subject is risk neutral, i.e. U ′′(.) = 0.
This yields four elicited choices where we can ascer-
tain whether equation (1) is true for each subject in each
condition. Specifically, we set the receiver’s endowment
η = 10, the unfavorable state-based payoff piB = 0, and
the senders compensation λ = 13 in all four conditions.
We set the favorable state-based payoff piA to 12, 18, 22,
or 28 in four conditions, labeled condition 1 through 4,
respectively, shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter Values for Conditions
Endowment Investment Payoff
η piB piA
Condition 1 10 0 12
Condition 2 10 0 18
Condition 3 10 0 22
Condition 4 10 0 28
All payoffs reported in US $.
2.3. Attitudes towards risk
The main assumption behind the standard equilibrium
predictions is that subjects are risk-neutral. We elicit
subjects’ risk preferences from a set of four gambles as
in Table 2. Assuming there is no information content
in the sender’s message, the gambles are equivalent to
the four conditions of the sender-receiver game reported
in Table 1. In each gamble, subjects are asked to state
whether they prefer a safe option (equivalent to η) with
probability one, or a risky option where the probability
of the high value (equivalent to piA) and the low value
(equivalent to piB) are both one-half.
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Table 2: Elicitation of Risk Preferences
Safe Option Risky Option
Low Value High Value
Gamble 1 10 0 12
Gamble 2 10 0 18
Gamble 3 10 0 22
Gamble 4 10 0 28
Risky option paid low or high values with equal
probabilities.
All payoffs reported in US $.
2.4. Procedures
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University
at the Economic Science Institute. Subjects were re-
cruited from a standard subject pool consisting primar-
ily of undergraduate students. Subjects interacted with
each other anonymously over a local computer network.
The experiment was programmed and conducted using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers were placed
within individual cubicles in such a way that all sub-
jects could only view their own computer screen. The
subjects acted both in the role of sender and receiver in
four settings where we altered piA. We elicited the sub-
jects decisions using the strategy method for both roles
and the four settings simultaneously.
Each of the three sessions lasted approximately fifty-
five minutes, consisted of 20 to 24 subjects, and were
sequenced as follows:
1. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while
each subject followed along with their own copy
of the instructions. The instructions explained the
experimental procedures, payoffs, and information
structures used in the experiment (instruction avail-
able in the appendix). While going over the in-
structions, subjects were asked to write down their
answers to several questions to ensure that they
understood the instructions. Subjects’ answers re-
mained confidential to other subjects. The experi-
menter reviewed the correct answers privately with
each subject.2 During and after the instructions
were read, subjects were prompted to ask the ex-
perimenter in private any questions regarding the
experiment procedures.
2Subjects on average answered less than one question incorrectly.
2. Each subject simultaneously played both roles of
sender and receiver in all four settings, by choos-
ing what message to send for each possible pri-
vate signal and whether to invest for each possible
sender’s message. That is, for both values of the
private signal, the sender made a binary choice to
reveal the signal truthfully or not. For each pos-
sible message, the receiver made a binary choice
either not to invest (labeled ‘Stay’) or to invest (la-
beled ‘Go’). Consequently the subject was ran-
domly and anonymously paired with other sub-
jects. The computer randomly selected the set-
ting, the role for payment and the state of nature,
and presented an outcome screen to each individ-
ual subject. However, the outcome screen was not
presented until the very end of the experiment, af-
ter all parts of the experiment were completed.
3. Then all subjects were asked to choose gambles in
a task designed to elicit risk attitudes, using the
method described in section 2.3. Subjects were
not aware of this task until after we elicited their
choices from the preceding step. One of the four
choices was randomly selected for payment.
4. Each subject was paid a $7 participation fee, the
payoffs from one scenario and one gamble. Each
participant individually signed and dated a pay-
ment receipt form and received payment. On av-
erage subjects earned $18 in addition to their par-
ticipation fee.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive Statistics
We found no significant differences between the three
sessions and thus report the combined results. For all
hypothesis tests, we use the choices for each partic-
ipant, yielding 64 independent observations. Unless
stated otherwise we perform the Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test.
In the role of sender 13 of 64 subjects chose to always
reveal their private information regarding the state. As
shown in Figure 1, most subjects reveal the state A, but
report A when the state is B. The practice of deception
is consistent across conditions; we find no significant
differences in senders’ behavior within subjects across
conditions.
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Figure 1: Senders Choices Over Four Conditions
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In the role of receiver, 60 of 64 subjects chose to invest
in at least one of the four conditions. The aggregate
behavior is shown in Figure 2. Investment conditioned
upon each message is increasing over conditions, from
42 out of 64 when piA = 12 to 58 out of 64 when piA = 28.
The increase is significant a p-value ≤ 0.01
Figure 2: Receivers Choices Over Four Conditions
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3.2. Analysis
In order to ascertain whether subjects believe there is
information content in other sender’s report, we com-
pare choices from the risk preference elicitation to the
investment choices. If there is no perceived information
content in the sender’s report, the exercises are identical.
These choices are shown in Figure 3. In all conditions
we find that the number of subjects choosing to invest
when the report is favorable exceeds those choosing the
risky over safe gamble.
Figure 3: Receivers Investment and Risk Choices
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Number of 64 subjects reported who invest in four
conditions and choose risky option in four gambles.
Comparing investment conditioned upon risk choices,
there are 48 of 64 subjects who chose to invest despite
choosing the safe option in the equivalent gamble, in at
least one condition. Thus it appears that receivers are
inferring information content from senders’ messages.
This interpretation is supported by statistical analysis
comparing each subjects number of risky choices to
the number of investment choices, yielding a p-value
≤ 0.01.
To ascertain whether social norms of honesty and trust-
ing drive behavior, we compare each subjects behavior
across both roles. If the subject chose to always reveal
their private information, the subject was coded as hon-
est, else as deceptive. If they chose to invest when de-
spite choosing the corresponding safe gamble, the sub-
ject was coded as trusting, otherwise skeptical. The re-
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sults are reported in Figure 4. Only one subject is clas-
sified as honest in the role of sender but skeptical in the
role of receiver; this subject always chose the risky gam-
ble. A majority of subjects are classified as deceptive
and trusting.3 The null hypothesis that behavior is con-
sistent (honest and trusting or deceptive and skeptical)
is rejected, at a p-value ≤ 0.01.
Figure 4: Subject Behavior Over Both Roles
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3.3. Discussion
What framework might predict why a subject in one role
acts deceptively, but that same subject in another role
trusts? Theories based on hierarchical thinking, com-
monly labeled level-k thinking, posit that subjects be-
have strategically according to their beliefs of others’
strategic behavior (Stahl and Wilson, 1994). Hierarchi-
cal thinking models define subjects by type, where each
type represents the subject’s belief of others’ strategies.
By first setting beliefs of a L-0 type, each successive
type is modeled as playing the rational best response
given that others are lesser types. By construction, L-1
best responds to L-0, L-2 best responds to a mixture of
L-1 and L-0, and so forth.
3We do not claim behavior to be naı¨ve, but if decision to invest is a
best response to anticipated behavior, that behavior is not the subject’s
own behavior.
Crawford (2003) argues the base behavior in
communication-game is to tell the truth as a sender
and trust messages as a receiver. Consistent with
hierarchical thinking models, we find that some sub-
jects act honestly and trusting analogous to L-0. Half
the subjects are deceptive and trusting analogous to
L-1, which is also the best response to others using
L-0 strategies. Lastly, some subjects are deceptive
and skeptical analogous to L-2, which is the best
response to the majority of others using L-1 strategies.
Only one of 64 subjects appears honest and skeptical.
These findings are consistent with Blume et al (2001),
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2008), and Wang et al (2010).
4. Conclusion
We designed an experiment to study individual behav-
ior in a strategic information setting where the sender
has economic incentives to deceive and the receiver has
economic incentives to avoid deception. To ascertain
whether subjects in the role of receiver gleaned infor-
mation content from the sender’s message, we elicited
choices from risky gambles constructed to be mathe-
matically equivalent to the information setting if the
sender’s message lacks information content. In the ex-
periment subjects acted simultaneously as a sender and
receiver in a one-shot interaction. We find that sub-
jects tend to act deceptively as senders but trusting as
receivers. However, as receivers, subjects glean infor-
mation content from senders’ messages. Finally, a ma-
jority of subjects in the role of receiver do not play a best
response to their own behavior in the role of sender.
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A. Instructions
This is a computerized experiment in the economics of
decision-making. By following the instructions care-
fully and making good decisions, you may earn an ad-
ditional amount of money besides the show up bonus of
$7. The currency used in this experiment is US dollars.
The actual amount of additional money that you may
earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of
other participants. Your money will be paid to you in
cash after the experiment ends.
There are some rules you must follow:
1. Do not talk to others at any time during the experi-
ment.
2. You will use your computer to select decisions dur-
ing the experiment. Do not use your mouse or key-
board to play around with the software running on
your computer. If you unintentionally or intention-
ally close the software program running on your
computer, you will be asked to leave. If this hap-
pens, you will receive only your show up bonus.
3. If you have any questions during the experiment
or instructions, please raise your hand. An experi-
menter will come to your location and answer your
questions.
Details of the Experiment
Grouping of Participants
The experiment consists of a single round. Within this
round you will be randomly paired with up to eight
other participants, but into separate groupings. There
are four settings. Within each setting there will be a
single Sender and a single Receiver. You will make de-
cisions both as a Sender and Receiver in all settings.
These settings are separate, as your decisions in one set-
ting or role will not affect what happens in the other set-
tings.
You will never be told whom you are paired with. You
are not allowed to communicate with others during the
experiment.
Overview of the Setting
Each Receiver has one unit of the financial asset. At the
end of each round, the computer determines the State of
the economy, which in turn dictates the value of each
Receivers asset. The chances of a particular State are:
Table A.1: Chances of States
State A B
Chance of State 1/2 1/2
The State will be either A or B. There is an equal chance
that the computer will select A or B. So, on average the
computer will select A 50 percent of the time and B 50
percent of the time.
At the beginning of each round the Sender privately
learns the State. No one else learns the State before the
end of the round.
After the Sender learns the State, the Sender sends a Re-
port to the Receiver. After the Receiver sees the Senders
Report, the Receiver decides to Go or Stay resulting in
the following payoffs.
Table A.2: Payoffs Given State and Receiver’s Decisions
State is A B
Receiver decides to Go
Receiver X 0
Sender 13 13
Receiver decides to Stay
Receiver 10 10
Sender 0 0
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The value of X depends upon the setting. It will either
be 12, 18, 22, or 28.
Notice that only when the State is A are the payoffs
higher for all parties when the Receiver decides to Go
rather than to Stay. Also notice that the payoff is higher
for the Sender if the Receiver decides to Go rather then
to Stay in both States A and B. Last, notice that the pay-
offs do not depend on the Sender’s Report, only on the
State and whether the Receiver decides to Go or Stay.
What is the Sender’s Report? If the Sender learns the
State is A, the Sender can decide to report either A or B.
If the Sender learns the State is B, the Sender can decide
to Report A or B.
Questionnaire 1
Below, please write down your answers to the following
questions. If you have a question please raise your hand
and an experimenter will privately answer your ques-
tion. In a few minutes, an experimenter will review the
correct answers.
1. What is the chance the State will be B? (0, 1/2, 1)
2. If the Sender knows the State is B, what can she
report? (A, B, A or B)
3. If the Receiver knew the State was A, would he or
she be paid more if they Go rather than Stay? (Yes,
No)
4. If the Receiver knew the State was B, would he or
she be paid more if they Go rather than Stay? (Yes,
No)
5. If the Receiver decides to Go, what will the Sender
receive? ($10, $13)
Sender’s Decision
We will ask you to make a decision in the role of Sender
in four settings. In each setting the payoff to the receiver
if he goes in State A is 12, 18, 22, or 28. Specifically, we
will ask you to make a decision about what you would
report to the paired Receiver in advance of seeing the
State drawn. When the experiment starts you will see
the following on your screen (see figure A).
On the left side of the screen you are asked as a Sender
to fill in the two entries for each of four settings. If the
State were equal to A, would you report A or B, and
if the State were equal to B, would you report A or B?
Specifically, for each possible State, you need to tell the
computer what Report you will send.
We want you, as the Sender, to say in advance what you
would do in both of the scenarios. The computer imple-
ments the decisions you make once the State is drawn.
Your decision will not affect which State is drawn. Your
decision in the role of Sender will not affect the outcome
of the settings in which you are a Receiver. Your deci-
sion will note effect the other settings.
Receiver’s Decision
We will ask you to make a decision in the role of Re-
ceiver in four settings. In each setting the payoff to
the receiver in State A is 12, 18, 22, or 28 if he goes.
Specifically, we will ask you to make a decision about
what you would do for each possible Report the paired
Sender might send before you see the Report. When
the experiment starts you will see the following on your
screen (see figure A).
On the right side of the screen you are asked as a Re-
ceiver to fill in the two entries for each of four settings.
If the Senders Report were A, do you want to Go or
Stay, and if the Senders Report were B, do you want
to Go or Stay? Although, in the end as a Receiver you
would see only one Report (A or B), we still want you
to tell us what you would do for each possible Report.
Your decision will not affect which Report is sent or
which State drawn. Your decision in the role of Receiver
will not effect the outcome of the settings in which you
are a Sender.
Questionnaire 2
Below, please write down your answers to the follow-
ing questions. In a few minutes, an experimenter will
review the correct answers.
1. If the Sender elects to report A always, what report
will the Receiver see when the State is A? (A, B)
2. If the Sender elects to report A always, what report
will the Receiver see when the State is B? (A, B)
3. Does the Receiver always have to Go? (Yes, No)
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Figure A: Input screen used experiment
4. If the Sender’s Report is B, can the State be A?
(Yes, No)
5. If the Sender’s Report is A, can the State be B?
(Yes, No)
Results of the Round
After you make both your decisions, the decision in the
role of Sender and the decision in the role of Receiver,
click on the red Submit button. After all participants
input their decisions, the computer will display the out-
come screen with the outcome from one of the six set-
tings. One, and only one, of your settings will be ran-
domly selected and you will be paid on the outcome of
that setting. For example, if the setting in which you
played the role of Receiver was selected for payment,
then your screen would show:
How is this table generated? After all the participants
have input their decisions, the computer will draw real-
izations of the State independently for each pair. The
computer determines the State randomly as based on
Chances of State table. Given the decision input by the
Sender, the Report is determined and appears under the
Table A.3: Results of the Round
State
Sender’s report
Receiver’s decision
Sender’s payoff
Receiver’s payoff
caption Senders Report. Note this is the Senders Report-
not the State.
Next, using the decision input by the Receiver, the com-
puter reports if the Receiver decided to Stay or Go for
the given Senders Report. This decision is reported in
the row titled Receivers decision. Finally, the computer
determines the payoffs (taken from Payoffs Given State
and Receivers Decisions table) given the State and the
decisions for the Sender and the Receiver. These pay-
offs are reported in the last two rows titled Senders pay-
off and Receivers payoff.
To summarize, the experiment consists of a single round
where:
1. Grouping of Participants: pairs are randomly as-
signed.
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2. Participant’s Decisions: each participant enters
both a decision in the role of Sender and a deci-
sion in the role of Receiver.
3. Payoffs: the computer randomly selects one setting
calculates payoffs using the decisions input.
4. Results for the round: each participant sees payoff
from the setting where he/she was the Sender or
from the setting where he/she was the Receiver.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private
and in cash.
Questionnaire 3
Below, please write down your answers to the follow-
ing questions. In a few minutes, an experimenter will
review the correct answers
1. You will be paid for one of your settings, not both.
(True/False)
2. Suppose the setting where if the Receiver goes in
State A he or she gets 18. If the State is A, the
Sender reports ‘A’ when the State is A, and the Re-
ceiver decides to Go when the Report is ‘A’, what
is:
a. The Sender’s Report? (A, B)
b. The Receiver’s payoff? (0, 10, 18)
c. The Sender’s payoff? (0, 13)
3. Suppose the setting where if the Receiver goes in
State A he or she gets 22. If the State is B, the
Sender reports ‘A’ when the State is B, and Re-
ceiver decides to Stay when the Report is ‘A’, what
is:
a. The Sender’s Report? (A, B)
b. The Receiver’s payoff? (0, 10, 22)
c. The Sender’s payoff? (0, 13)
The following portion of instructions was distributed af-
ter choices were made in aforementioned settings.
4 Decision Problems
In this part of the experiment you are asked to make a
series of choices in 4 decision problems. How much
you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on
the choices you make. The decision problems are not
designed to test you. What we want to know is what
choices you would make in them. The only right answer
is what you really would choose.
For each line in the table, please state whether you pre-
fer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of
4 lines in the table but only one line will be randomly
selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be
selected, and you do not know which line will be se-
lected when you make your choices. Hence you should
pay attention to the choice you make in every line. Af-
ter you have completed all your choices the computer
will randomly drawn a number from 1 to 4. The drawn
number determines which line is going to be selected
for payment.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which op-
tion you chose: If you chose option A in that line, you
will receive $10. If you chose option B in that line, you
will receive either a positive amount or $0. To illustrate,
say the line drawn for payment is #2. To determine your
earnings another number is randomly drawn from 1 to 2.
The drawn number is then compared with the numbers
in the line selected (see the table). If the drawn number
is 1 you earn $18, but if the drawn number is 2 you earn
$0.
While you have all the information in the table, we ask
you that you input all your choices into the computer.
The actual earnings for this part will be determined at
the end, and will be independent of the prior portions.
Table A.4: Option payoffs
Line Option A Option B
#1 $10 $12 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
#2 $10 $18 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
#3 $10 $22 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
#4 $10 $28 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
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